We now turn to the most controversial argument of Hume's "Of Scepticism with Regard to Reason", which I shall call the "iterative probability argument". The conclusion of Hume's argument seems to render a wide-ranging negative epistemic verdict: " ... [w] hen I reflect on the natural fallibility of my judgment ... all the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence" (T1.4.1.6, 183). If there is indeed a total extinction of evidence for any belief, then no belief has any epistemic merit. All beliefs are on a par, epistemically speaking. On the face of it, this conclusion seems to be a simple but significant statement of epistemic egalitarianism. Moreover, even those who do not interpret Hume as a sceptic recognize the overall importance of this argument for all Hume interpreters (see Morris 1989, 58) . So it is easy to see why this passage is so vital for developing a clear view of Hume's thoughts on scepticism.
Interestingly enough, commentators ignored this argument for a long time. Robert Fogelin lists some of the more puzzling instances of this neglect:
Penelhum [1975] dismisses this portion of the Treatise in a footnote: "I omit discussion of the unappetizing arguments of ... 'Scepticism with Regard to Reason'" ... Neither Stroud [1977] nor Capaldi [1975] mention the argument at all. The omission in Capaldi's work is extraordinary given the fact that one of his purposes is to show that Hume is utterly misidentified as a skeptic of anything of the most modest kind. (1985, 173) (2005/1941, 362) surrounding his writings. Kemp Smith's comments about this passage strongly suggest that it provides the raw ingredients to make a compelling case to read Hume as a sceptic. In fact, by labelling Hume's wording in this section "misleading", Kemp Smith implies that the most obvious or natural reading of this passage is radically sceptical. So if we apply (PIP) to this argument, then we seem to have some justification for attributing epistemic egalitarianism to Hume because even Kemp Smith implies that Hume's text appears to assert scepticism. The problem is that this prima facie justification has been undermined recently by several novel and ingenious interpretations from those who read Hume as an antisceptical naturalist. The burden of proof thus rests on those who want to neutralize these naturalist defeaters/readings and return to interpreting Hume as a sceptic in I.iv.1.
This chapter has four major sections. In the first significant section, I explain Hume's sceptical argument and highlight some of its crucial assumptions about fallibility and its normative impact. Moreover, I introduce an important interpretive issue about the meaning of a key term in Hume's argument: "evidence". While some try to blunt the sceptical thrust of Hume's argument by offering an interesting non-normative reading of Hume's use of "evidence", the second section shows that such a reading fails. In the third section I scrutinize the now common naturalistic strategy of claiming that Hume's sceptical argument attacks only his opponents and does not have general application. The fourth section shows how the main structure of Hume's argument allows the sceptical reasoning to apply to all positions, even Hume's. The upshot is that we have good reason to categorize Hume as an epistemic egalitarianism.
I. Fallibility and the extinction of evidence
Having argued that all our propositional attitudes are fallible and thus controlled by "probabilities", Hume emphasizes the importance of investigating such probabilistic reasoning to " ... see on what foundation it stands" (T1.4.1.4, 181). Hume then returns to the key point of his previous argument: if a belief is fallible, then we should not accept any fallible belief at face value. Indeed, Hume claims that we have a duty to consider the possibility that we have erred, even in non-mathematical contexts:
In every judgment, which we can form concerning probability, as well as concerning knowledge, we ought always to correct the first
